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Justice on the Far Side of the World:
The Continuing Problem of Misconduct
by Civilians Accompanying the Armed
Forces in Foreign Countries
By THOMAS G. BECKER"

I. Introduction
Nick and Dale didn't know one another before that night. As
young men who had attended the same high school, they were only
vaguely aware of one another. They had their first real meeting on a
spring evening in 1992 at a yearbook signing party at the school. It
would prove to be their last.
Depending on whom one believes, Dale picked a fight with Nick
or Nick picked one with Dale. In any event, Dale beat up Nick. This
did not surprise many, as Dale was a star on the school's wrestling
team and was in superb physical shape. Also not surprising to anyone,
the fight broke up before the school's adult chaperon knew anything
about it. Nick, however, did not appreciate being Dale's punching
bag. He went home to his parents' apartment, picked up a steak
knife, and returned to the school. He confronted Dale just as he was
about to leave the party. Anxious to teach Nick another lesson, Dale
eagerly accepted Nick's invitation to fight. Instead of using his fists,
Nick struck with the knife, stabbing Dale in the heart. Dale died on
the way to surgery.
This type of tragedy has become all too common in American
communities. In the case of Nick and Dale, however, there was a difference-it didn't happen in the United States, and no American judicial process could hold Nick accountable for his actions. The
American community where Nick and Dale lived was a United States
* J.D., Washburn University, 1977. Colonel Becker is a judge advocate in the

United States Air Force, currently assigned as an appellate military judge, United States
Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, Washington D.C. The views expressed in this article

are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States
Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
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air base in Japan,1 and both young men lived with parents stationed
there.2 Despite cries on the base for American justice, no United
States court had the authority to put Nick on trial. Japanese authorities assumed jurisdiction, and Nick pleaded guilty in a Japanese court
to the equivalent of voluntary manslaughter and was sentenced to a
term of imprisonment. However, many members of the base community were left with the feeling that justice had not been done. Nick
had gotten away with a clear case of premeditated murder, and the
Japanese authorities lacked the motivation to adequately vindicate the
uniquely American interests in punishing this crime.
This case, and similar ones elsewhere in world, have re-awakened
interest in an old issue: What can American authorities do about civilians who commit crimes while accompanying the United States armed
forces in foreign countries?4 Military outposts on the "Far Side of the
World" have the potential to become sanctuaries for those who commit crimes and find that American law can not hold them accountable
for their crimes.
This Article will examine this issue, beginning with attempts to
use military law as a method of asserting American criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by civilians accompanying the armed
forces abroad. The Article will discuss how those attempts failed to
withstand constitutional scrutiny in a time of peace, and will then outline recent legislative proposals to extend the coverage of federal
criminal law to civilians on American military installations overseas.
Finally, this Article will examine various issues raised by proposed
legislation, and close with an analysis of whether such legislation is
really necessary.
1. The author is an Air Force judge advocate who was stationed at the base when the
killing occurred. His two children attended the same school as Dale and Nick and knew

both. The author lived in the same apartment building as Nick and his family. This account is based on local news coverage, interviews with military legal authorities familiar
with the case, and conversations with the author's children.
2. Nick's parents-his "sponsors" in the jargon of the military community overseaswere both civilian employees of food service contractors of the Army and Air Force Ex-

change Service. Dale's sponsor was his father, an Air Force noncommissioned officer.
3. These cries became especially intense when it became known that Nick had previously been sent back to the United States-his "command sponsorship" revoked-because

of previous misconduct, only to be allowed to return to Japan after completing a therapy
program. There were also unconfirmed rumors among the high school population that
Nick, during this period in the United States, had become a member of a gang.
4. Members of the armed services are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Jus-

tice, 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-940 (West 1983), and may be tried by court-martial wherever criminal offenses occur. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 802(a)(1) (West 1983); MANUAL FOR COURTSMARTIAL,

R.C.M. 201(a)(2)(1984); Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
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II. Jurisdiction Over Civilians Under Military Law
Prior to the advent of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in
1951, the statutory foundations of the military justice system were the
Articles of War, which governed the Army and the Air Force, and the
Articles of the Government of the Navy.5 Prior to World War II,
neither the Army nor the Navy maintained an extensive overseas
presence involving large bases and significant accompanying civilian
populations. Consequently, neither service had any real need to create a legal framework for dealing with misconduct by civilians accompanying soldiers, sailors, and marines on foreign shores. Nevertheless,
military law prior to World War H did address court-martial jurisdiction over civilians.
A.

The Articles of War

In his famous late 19th century treatise on military law, Colonel
William Woolsey Winthrop 6 discussed several instances where the Articles of War applied to civilians in wartime. Wartime jurisdiction attached to "[a]ll retainers to the camp, and all persons serving with the
armies of the United States in the field."17 Within the term "retainers
to the camp," Winthrop included "camp-followers," an inelegant term
embracing soldiers' families and other companions.' Additionally, the
wartime offenses of espionage and treating with the enemy applied to
all civilians and military personnel.9 Concerning peacetime, however,
Winthrop was adamant that the Constitution did not allow military
jurisdiction over civilians. "In [his] judgement, a statute cannot be
5. The Articles of War were first promulgated by the Continental Congress in 1775.
Starting in 1776, the Articles of War were periodically revised through acts of Congress,
the last major revision occurring in 1920. See 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 1471-1593 (1920) (repealed
1956); see generally,TiH J
Ta

UNITED STATES

GE ADVOCATE GENERAL oF'mE ARMY, MrLiTARY LAws oF

(Army) 251-53 (9th ed. 1950) (giving a general history of the Articles

of War). The Articles of the Government of the Navy were adopted in 1S00 and remained
essentially unchanged until World War II. See Act of Apr. 23, 1S00, 2 Stat. 47 (1800); See
also 34 U.S.C.A. §§ 1200-01 (1946) (repealed 1956).
6. Colonel Winthrop is acknowledged by legal scholars as "the Blackstone of Military
Law." Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19 n.38 (1957).
7. COLONEL WILIAM WTINTIROP, MILITARY LAW AND PREcENrrs 93 (2d ed.
1920) (quoting from Article 63 of the 1874 Code).
8. Id. at 99 n.94.
9. Id. at 102. Article 45 of the 1874 Code defines treating the enemy as "whosoever
relieves the enemy ...or knowingly harbors or protects an enemy...

."

Article 46 of the

1874 Code defines espionage as "whosoever holds correspondence with, or gives intelligence to, the enemy." Id.
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framed by which a civilian can lawfully be made amenable to the military jurisdictionin time of peace."10
Winthrop, however, could not have foreseen the type of large
scale or long term deployments to foreign countries first necessitated
by World War I. As part of an extensive 1920 revision of the Articles
of War, Congress recognized a need to control and discipline the many
civilians accompanying our expeditionary forces and thus adopted Article 2(d):
All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving
with the armies of the United States without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, and in time of war all such retainers and
persons accompanying or serving with the armies of the United
States in the field, both within and without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, though not otherwise subject to these
articles. 1
Article 2(d) extended the Army's court-martial jurisdiction in
two ways. The second clause clarified the military's traditional wartime jurisdiction over civilians accompanying forces in the field both
within and without United States territory. More significantly, and in
apparent defiance of Winthrop's considered opinion, the first clause
applied the Articles of War to civilians accompanying the Army
outside American territory, even in peacetime.
B. Articles of the Government of the Navy
The law governing the court-martial jurisdiction of the Navy developed in a similar fashion. In general, the Articles of the Government of the Navy limited their jurisdiction to any "person in the naval
service,"" "person in the Navy,"' 3 "person in the naval service of the
United States,"' 4 or "persons belonging to the Navy."' 5 However, the
Article dealing with spies in wartime applied to "[a]ll persons," including civilians, regardless of any ties to the Navy. 16 Further, in recognition of the unique challenge presented by violent crime on the high
seas, Navy courts-martial could try "any person belonging to any public vessel of the United States [who] commits the crime of murder
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id at 107; see also iLat 105.
10 U.S.C.A. § 1473(d)(1920) (repealed 1956).
34 U.S.C.A. § 1200, art. 4 (repealed 1956).
Id. art. 8.
Id. art. 14.
Id. arts. 22(a), 23.
Id. art. 5.
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17
without the territorial jurisdiction thereof" even in a time of peace.
With this provision in mind, Congress apparently saw no need to extend the Navy's jurisdiction over civilians following World War I, and
there was no amendment to the Articles of the Government of the
Navy to complement Article 2(d) of the Articles of War.
World War II brought about a change of opinion and an amendment to the Articles of the Government of the Navy which would
later serve as the foundation for post-war attempts to subject civilians
overseas to military jurisdiction. On March 22,1943, Congress passed
Section 1201 to Title 34 of the United States Code. The Section states:
[I]n addition to the persons now subject to the Articles of the Government of the Navy, all persons, other than persons in the military
service of the United States, outside the continental limits of the
United States accompanying or serving with the United States
Navy, the Marine Corps, or the Coast Guard when serving as part
of the Navy, including but not limited to persons employed by the
Government directly, or by contractors or subcontractors engaged
in naval projects, and all persons, other than persons in the military
service of the United States, within an area leased by the United
States which is without the territorial jurisdiction thereof and which
is under the control of the Secretary of the Navy, shall, in time of
war ornationalemergency, be subject to the Articles of the Government of the Navy ....(emphasis added).

This legislation was obviously the product of war."' However,
like Article 2(d) of the Articles of War, section 1201 extended the
Navy's legal power over civilians in circumstances outside of war. The
new section contained two clauses. The second clause created enclaves of naval jurisdiction over anyone located in leased areas outside
of United States territory, but only during wartime or "national emergency." The opening clause, however, extended without restriction
the Navy's court-martial jurisdiction to civilians "accompanying or
serving with" the sea services "outside the continental limits of the
United States."
C. Uniform Code of Military Justice
At the end of World War II, there were two independent statutory schemes for military jurisdiction. Each applied primarily to uniformed personnel, but contained long-established provisions for
17. l& art. 6.

18. See Hammon v. Squier, 51 F. Supp. 227, 231 (W.D. Wash. 1943) (stating that 34
U.S.C.A. § 1201 was intended to expand Navy jurisdiction during wartime).
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limited wartime jurisdiction over civilians. As a result of 20th Century
wartime experiences, each set of statutes was amended to extend jurisdiction over certain classes of civilians even in peacetime. Within this
framework, Congress began its post-World War II task of creating a
uniform code for administering military justice. Among other issues,
Congress had to determine the limits of military jurisdiction in the
new Cold War environment and, in particular, how far the jurisdiction
would reach into the civilian population.
The new Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J. or "Code"),
which became effective in 1951, retained the military's traditional wartime jurisdiction over all "persons serving with or accompanying an
armed force in the field."1 9 In addition, using Article 2(d) of the Articles of War and Section 1201 of the Navy Articles as a foundation, 20
Congress included section 802(a)(11) and (12) in the U.C.M.J.:
(a) The following persons are subject to [the U.C.M.J]:
(11) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United
States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international
law, persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed
forces outside the United States and outside the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.
(12) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United
States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international
law, persons within an area leased by or otherwise reserved or acquired for the use of the United States which is under the control of
the Secretary concerned and which is outside the United States and
outside 21
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin
Islands.
Although based in large part on the previous amendments, these
post-war provisions went further. They broadened the jurisdiction
over civilians previously conferred by Article of War 2(d) by including
persons "employed by" the armed forces, as well as those "accompanying or serving with" the military outside the United States. They
also extended the military's jurisdiction over "persons within an area
leased by or acquired for the use of the United States" to peacetime
19. 10 U.S.C.A. § 802(a)(10) (West 1983).
20. Uniform Code of Military Justice: Hearings on S. 857 Before the Senate Armed
Services Comm., 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 103 (1949) (statement of Sen. McCarran) [hereinafter
Senate Hearings]; S. Rm,. No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1949) [hereinafter S. REP.];
H.R. REP. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949) [hereinafter H.R. REP.].

21. 10 U.S.C.A. § 802(a)(11), (12) (West 1983 & Supp. 11994).
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(previously granted to the Navy in wartime by Section 1201 of the
Navy Articles). 2
This expansion of the military's peacetime jurisdiction over civilians was intentional and subjected to trial by courts-martial the families of military members, other civilians whose presence on or near
overseas installations was closely tied to the military's activities, and
even civilian employees of the armed forces whose proximity was but
incidental to military operations? 3 Within the statute itself, the only
limitations to the exercise of this jurisdiction were treaties and customary international law.
Article 2(a)(11) and (12) of the proposed new Code was challenged by people who were concerned that the provisions threatened
to open "the door to a military dictatorship,"2 4 or who were otherwise
wary of increased military control over Americans not in uniform.
However, no one questioned the need for Congress to provide for the
control of civilian members of overseas American military communities, and no serious alternative to court-martial jurisdiction was proposed. Suggestions that Congress could provide for civilian criminal
jurisdiction in such cases were quickly dropped when the constitutional basis for such jurisdiction was questioned. 6
Nowhere in the legislative history of the U.C.M.J. does it appear
that anyone seriously researched the legality of giving extraterritorial
effect to the federal criminal code, or of conferring jurisdiction to federal courts over civilians accompanying the armed forces in foreign
countries. Furthermore, nowhere in this legislative history is there an
indication that anyone considered the opinion of Colonel Winthrop,
"the Blackstone of Military Law," that "a statute cannot be framed by
22. Senate Hearings,supra note 20, at 103 (statement of Sen. McCarran); S. RPr.,
supra note 20.

23. The Judge Advocate General, United States Navy, Congressional Floor Debate on
the Uniform Code of Military Justice 201-02, 230 (1949) [hereinafter Floor Debate]. An
example of incidental proximity would be a civilian employee who was already living near

an overseas American base before its installation. If the post had never been built, the
person would still live and work in the area. His connection to the American military

community is, therefore, incidental.
24. Uniform Code of Military Justice: Hearingson H.. 2493 Before the House Armed

Services Comm., 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 743 (1949) (testimony of Colonel Oliver) [hereinafter
House Hearings].

25. House Hearings,supra note 24, at 6S0, 683, 6S9 (statement of John Finn); Senate
Hearings,supra note 20, at 196 (statement of John Finn); House Hearings,supra note 24,
at 768 (testimony of Richard L. Tedrow).

26. House Hearings,supra note 24, at 750-51 (testimony of Colonel Oliver), 76S (testimony of Richard L. Tedrow).
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which a civilian can lawfully be made amenable to the military jurisdiction in time of peace." 27 This very question, however, would soon
be before the United States Supreme Court, and at the center of this
controversy would be Article 2(a)(11) of the U.C.M.J.
D. Article 2(a)(11) and the United States Supreme Court
In the case of Kinsella v. Krueger,28 an Army colonel stationed in
Japan was killed by his wife. She was brought to trial before a general
court-martial pursuant to Article 2(a)(11), convicted of murder, and
sentenced to life in prison. After her conviction was affirmed by the
United States Court of Military Appeals, 9 she petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus, challenging the constitutionality of the court-martial's
exercise of jurisdiction. The case eventually reached the Supreme
Court which ruled that Article 2(a)(11) was constitutional. The Court
held that the Constitution did not require trials of Unted States nationals by United States authorities in foreign countries to be conducted by Article III courts. It stated that Congress could use its
powers to establish Article I courts to try Americans outside United
States territory, and that it was reasonable to employ courts-martial in
cases of civilians accompanying the armed forces. The Court saw no
particular problem with the lack of certain constitutional protections
in trials by court-martial, 30 as this was no different than procedures
employed by other Article I courts. Kinsella v. Krueger was a major
victory for the proponents of the Code's expansive peacetime jurisdiction over civilians. However, the victory was short-lived.
27. WiRTHROP, supra note 7, at 107.
28. 351 U.S. 470 (1956).

29. The United States Court of Military Appeals is a civilian court which, at the time
of Kinsella v. Krueger, was the highest appellate court in the military justice system. In
1983, however, Congress amended the U.C.M.J. to provide for direct appeals to the
Supreme Court from the Court of Military Appeals. See 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 941-46, 867 (West
1994).

30. The major constitutional differences between courts-martial and civilian criminal
courts revolve around the Fifth Amendment right to Grand Jury indictment and the Article III, Section 2 requirement of a trial by jury. The Fifth Amendment excludes "cases
arising in the land or naval forces" from the Grand Jury requirement. Because courts-

martial are not Article III courts, the jury trial mandate does not apply. In place of Grand
Juries, an investigation is held before referring charges to a general court-martial. See 10
U.S.C.A. § 832 (West 1983). See also MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARIAL, R.C.M. 405,
Court-martial "juries" (called "members") are composed of officers and, if the accused
requests, enlisted persons who are not in the same unit. All must be superior in rank to the
accused, when possible. Court members are selected by the convening authority of the

court-martial on a "best qualified" basis, considering age, education, tining, experience,
length of service, and judicial temperament. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 825 (West Supp. 11994).
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In the following term, the Supreme Court decided Reid v. Covoverturning both Kinsella v. Krueger and the Court's prior opinion in Reid.32 Reid v. Covert involved two habeas corpus petitions
from wives of servicemen. Each had killed her husband-one in England and the other in Japan-and had been convicted of premeditated
murder in a general court-martial. Although both murders were potentially capital crimes,33 both women were sentenced to imprisonment for life.
The principal opinion, concurred in by four justices, 3 held that
Article 2(a)(11) could not be constitutionally applied in peacetime.
This opinion repudiated the basic premise of Krueger that the Constitution did not follow the flag overseas ("[We reject the idea that
when the United States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of
the Bill of Rights" 35 ) and focused on the nonapplicability in military
law of the Fifth Amendment's Grand Jury requirement and the lack of
trial by jury (at least in the sense envisioned by Article HI, Section 2)
at courts-martial.36 This plurality of justices rejected arguments that
peacetime application of Article 2(a)(11) of the Code was justified
under Congress' power "[t]o make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces" '37 because civilian spouses do
not belong to the land and naval forces. The opinion also repudiated
the theory that this jurisdiction could be sustained under the "necessary and proper" clause, 33 refusing to approve powers contravening
the Bill of Rights in peacetime as either necessary or proper. The
principal opinion also rejected the notion that a treaty with a host
country, which purported to grant jurisdiction over American civilians
in certain cases to the United States military, somehow supplied a lawful foundation for court-martial jurisdiction, holding that no treaty
could confer on Congress power that is free from Constitutional
restraints.
ert,3

31. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
32. Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956). However, the Court subsequently ordered
the case to be reargued during the next term.

33. Reid v. Covert, 352 U.S. 901 (1956). Under the U.C.MJ. premeditated murder is
punishable by "death or imprisonment for life as a court-martial may direct." 10 U.S.C.A.
§ 918 (Vest 1983).

34. The Court was split 6 to 2, with two justices concurring in the result. The newly
appointed Justice Whittaker did not take part. 354 U.S. at 1-2.
35. Id.at 5.

36. See supra note 30.
37. 354 U.S. at 19-20.
38. Id at 20-21.
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Nonetheless, the Court made it clear that Article 2(a)(11) was
fully applicable in wartime. The Court also acknowledged the United
States legitimate interest in seeing that individuals such as the petitioners are brought before the bar of American justice in peacetime.
Citing Article III, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution, 39 Frankfurter's concurring opinion stated that "[n]o one... challenges the
availability to Congress of a power to provide for trial and punishment
of these dependents for such crimes."40
Concurring in the result in Reid v. Covert, Justices Frankfurter
and Harlan opined that Article 2(a)(11) could not be constitutionally
applied in peacetime to the petitioners because their offenses were
potentially capital. They did not agree with the conclusion that all
military jurisdiction over civilians in peacetime failed to pass constitutional muster. Justice Clark (who had written the Court's previous
opinion in Reid) and Justice Burton dissented. Because the principal
opinion lacked a majority, there remained a question as to whether
Article 2(a)(11) could be lawfully applied to non-capital crimes in
times of peace.
That question was answered in the negative three years later in
Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton,4 ' which held that the Reid v.
Covert rationale was fully applicable to all attempts at exercising
court-martial jurisdiction over civilians in peacetime, even for noncapital offenses. In Kinsella, the Court reiterated its observation in
Reid that Congress could address the problem in other ways:
Moreover, the immediate return to the United States permanently
of such civilian dependents, or their subsequent prosecution in the
United States for the more serious offenses when authorized by the
42
Congress, might well be the answer to the disciplinary problem.
In McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo,43 decided on the
same day as Singleton, the Court ruled that Article 2(a)(11) was inapplicable even when the civilian's crimes were directly related to his
employment in support of military operations." The Court again en39. "[B]ut when [crimes are] not committed within any State, the flial shall be at such
3.
Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed." U.S. CoNSr. art. III, § 2, cl.
40. 354 U.S. at 47.
41. Kinsella v. United States ex reL Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
42. Id. at 246.
43. McElroy v. United States ex rel Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
44. In Guagliardo,the employee was convicted of larceny for stealing from a United
States Air Force supply depot in Morocco. Id. at 282.
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dorsed Congressional action to extend federal court jurisdiction in
such cases.
In the wake of these rulings, Congress declined to amend the
Code. Article 2(a)(11) remains fully intact, albeit with the understanding that it may not be utilized in peacetime.45 Nearly forty years
have passed since Congress first took notice that military law cannot
constitutionally address civilian misconduct on American bases overseas. Congress has failed to follow the Supreme Court's suggestion
and extend federal court jurisdiction. Until Congress takes such action, civilians accompanying the armed forces overseas will either be
prosecuted by host countries, or not at all.
HI.

Legislative Proposals

Since Reid v. Covert and its progeny, there have been several
failed attempts in Congress to remedy this situation.4 6 The most recent effort was in 1993. Senator Inouye of Hawaii introduced S. 129 41
which would have amended Title 10 of the U.S. Code to provide that
conduct which would be criminal if engaged in within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, would also be
punishable as provided in Title 18 of the U.S. Code if committed by
civilians accompanying the armed forces overseas. In the House of
Representatives, Congressman Schiff of New Mexico moved to amend
the then-pending crime prevention and control bill4" to include a similar provision. Neither measure passed. These proposals, however,
raise issues which should be considered in drafting future legislation.
Some issues concern fundamental questions of constitutional and international law, while others concern implementation.
A.

ConstitutionalLaw
While certain members of Congress had expressed doubts concerning the constitutionality of extending United States jurisdiction

45. See MANuAL FoR COURTS-MARTIAL, R.C.M. 202(a) (Discussion). 'here have
been no published cases addressing the constitutionality of Article 2(a)(12) of the
U.C.MJ., which was considered to be a companion to Article 2(a)(11) during the original

hearings and debate over the Code. Presumably, this is because there has never been an
attempt to prosecute a civilian during peacetime under Article 2(a)(12) authority. In any

case, the rationale of Reid v. Covert and its progeny would appear to also render unconstitutional any peacetime application of Article 2(a)(12).
46. Captain Gregory A. McClelland, The Problem of turisdiction Over Civilians Accompanying the Forces Overseas-StillWith Us, 117 Mu- L. RE%,. 153, 199-200 (1981).
47. S. 129, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).

48. H.R. 3131, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Schiff Amendment].
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over crimes committed in foreign countries,49 the Supreme Court had
no difficulty concluding that Congress possessed the power to provide
for such jurisdiction when the offenses were committed by civilians
accompanying the military. 50 As noted by Justice Frankfurter in Reid
v. Covert,51 this power appears to be clearly stated in Article III, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution. Indeed, the ability of Congress
to apply United States law abroad appears to be a firmly rooted constitutional principle.5 3
Accordingly, there would appear to be negligible constitutional
objection to such legislation. However, the legality of such legislation
under international law must also be considered.
B. International Law
There is no serious doubt that Congress can extend American
laws to cover United States nationals living abroad.54 However, not
all civilians accompanying the United States military overseas are
American nationals. Furthermore, American overseas military installations employ many foreign nationals, usually hired from the local
population.
There is considerable doubt as to whether international law permits Congress to hold non-nationals criminally liable in the United
States for acts which occur outside the U.S. and which do not have
consequences within American territory. Indeed, the author has
found no authority within customary international law supporting the
idea that marriage to an American service member or employment by
the American military alone subjects a foreign national to United
States criminal jurisdiction. As stated by Judge Learned Hand in Al49. See House Hearings,supra note 24, at 751 (testimony of Colonel Oliver), 768 (tes-

timony of Richard L. Tedrow).
50. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Kinsella v. United States ex rel Singleton, 361
U.S. 234 (1960); McElroy v. United States ex rel Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
51. 354 U.S. at 47.
52. "The Thal of all Crimes ... shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall
have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such
Placeor Placesas the Congress may by Law have directed." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3

(emphasis added).
53. See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922); Blackmer v. United States, 284
U.S. 421 (1932); United States v. Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA), 148 F.2d
416 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1976): United States v.
Yunis, 681 F.Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988), aff'd 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
54. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421; RESTATEMENT (TfliRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402(2), 421(2)(d) (1987) [hereinafter RE.
STATEmENT (THID)].
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coa: "[I]t is settled law... that any state may impose liabilities, even
on persons not within its allegiance,for conduct outside its borders that
has consequences within its borderswhich the state reprehends...
(emphasis added). Absent an actual or intended territorial impact,
there has never been a case upholding the extraterritorial application
of a United States criminal statute against a foreign national for acts
56
outside of United States territory.
The legislation proposed by Congressman Schiff and Senator Inouye in 1993 addressed this issue, but in an incomplete fashion. The
Schiff Amendment would have excepted from coverage any civilian
employee "if such person is not a national of the United States,"57
while S. 129 would have exempted a civilian employee who was not a
United States national only if the individual "was appointed to his
position of employment in the country in which [he] engaged in [the
criminal offense]."5 Under either proposal, a family member who is
not a United States national would still not have been subject to the
jurisdiction of the American criminal courts. Under S. 129, jurisdiction would also have extended to any non-national employee who is
not hired in the country where he or she commits the offense.
Any attempt to extend United States federal jurisdiction to nonnationals beyond the accepted limits of international law would complicate prosecutions and undoubtedly present difficulties in relations
with the host nations. Indeed, this problem was envisioned by the
drafters of the Uniform Code of Military Justice as well. As a result of
this concern, Congress inserted language into Article 2(a)(11) and
(12), making each provision "[s]ubject to any treaty or agreement to
which the United States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of
international law.... ."9 Similar language should also be included in
any future legislation, making it clear that any conflict between the
assertion of United States jurisdiction and any treaty or accepted principle of customary international law would be resolved by denying
jurisdiction.
Adoption of such legislation would also require revision of some
of the agreements-called Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs)55. 148 F.2d at 443.
56. For examples of the converse, see United States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d 1200

(1991), cert denied 113 S.Ct. 2332 (1993); United States v. Noriega, 746 F.Supp. 1506 (S.D.
Fla. 1990); United States v. Yunis, 681 F.Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 19Ss).
57. Schiff Amendment, supra note 48, § 3262(c).

58. S. 129, supra note 47, § 992(c)(West Supp. 11994).
59. 10 U.S.C.A. § 802(a)(11)-(12) (1994). See S. REP., supra note 20, at 7-8; H.RL
REP., supra note 20, at 9; and Floor Debate,supra note 23, at 12, 83.
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between the United States and nations that host the United States'
military forces. Currently, many SOFAs provide for the exercise of
United States criminal jurisdiction only over persons subject to United
States military law, and operate to confer upon the host country jurisdiction over accompanying civilian employees and family members. 60
If legislation like S. 129 or the Schiff Amendment were adopted
(made expressly "subject to any treaty... or accepted rule of international law") and the SOFAs were revised to allow the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction over employees and family members, the potential
conflict with international law would be minimized. Subject to treaties such as a SOFA, a host nation has plenary jurisdiction over everyone in its territory.61 Under a revised SOFA, a host country would
undoubtedly retain exclusive jurisdiction over its nationals who may
be military employees or family members. However, the concurrent
jurisdiction over offenses committed by other civilians accompanying
American forces would then be divided between the U.S. and host
nation according to the type of offense, nationality of any victim, and
other circumstances.6' If the United States exercised extraterritorial
jurisdiction over a third country national 63 under these circumstances,
the validity of the prosecution under international law would be
strengthened by the host nation's recognition of the United States'
jurisdiction. However, American prosecutors would still have to overcome the fact that no accepted international law theory as yet supports prosecuting non-nationals for offenses committed outside of the
state's territory when the only nexus is the defendant's connection to
the armed forces and when there are no actual or intended effects in
the state.64
60. See, e.g., Administrative Agreement Under Article III of Security Agreement,
Feb. 28, 1952, U.S.-Japan, art. XVII, §§ 1(b), 2(b) [hereinafter Administrative Agreement].
61. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. at 15 n.29; REsTATEMENT (THnu), supra note 54,
§ 421(2)(a).
62. Such a delineation of primary rights of jurisdiction is present in SOFAs as currently written, addressing military members who are subject to both the U.C.M.J. and host
country law. For example, the SOFAs confer primary right of jurisdiction to the United
States for offenses committed against the property of the United States or solely against
the person or property of another American military member, employee, or dependent,
and for offenses arising from the performance of official duties. In all other cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the host country retains the primary right. The stzte holding the primary right may waive it. See, e.g., Administrative Agreement Under Article III of the
Security Agreement, Feb. 28, 1952, U.S.-Japan, art. XVII, § 2.
63. An example would be an offense committed in Japan by a British national who is
the spouse of an American military member stationed in Japan.
64. Under international law, five grounds are traditionally recognized as justifying a
state's extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction: Territorial,based on the place were an offense
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Accordingly, drafters of future legislation may wish to limit the
law's effect to American nationals. If so, international law complications will be avoided. On the other hand, such disparate treatment for
employees and family members due to their nationality is not entirely
satisfying.
C.

"EasierSaid Than Done" Implementing the Jurisdiction

Beyond the international law issues are practical concerns about
how to efficiently implement legislation extending federal criminal
statutes to civilians accompanying the military in foreign countries.
Foremost are questions of where the cases will be tried (i.e., venue)
and how to take custody and physically bring the offenders before a
court of the United States.
The issue of venue is already addressed by section 3238 of Title
18:
The trial of all offenses begun or committed upon the high seas, or
elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district,
shall be in the district in which the offender is arrested or first
brought. ...65
This statute further provides that, if the offender is not arrested or
brought into a particular district, then a complaint or information may
be filed in the district of his or her last known residence, or, if unknown, the District of Columbia.
Prosecutors, therefore, would have considerable flexibility in selecting the most convenient venue. Unlike venue, however, questions
as to how to arrest and detain civilians in order to transport them to
that venue, and how to provide them preliminary due process in the
interim, are much thornier. This is because such arrests and detentions would likely occur in locations where the only United States law
enforcement personnel and magistrates would be wearing military
uniforms.
is committed, or where its effects are intended or felt. National,based on the nationality of
the person committing the crime. Protective, based on a particular offense's threat to the

national interest, such as in counterfeiting and espionage. Universal, based on the nature
of certain crimes which are considered particularly heinous and harmful to humanity, such

as piracy and slavery. Passive personality, based on the nationality of the victim of an
offense. See REsrATEmNT (THi), supra note 54, § 402, § 402 commentary; United
States v. Yunis, 681 F.Supp. 896, 899-900 (DD.C. 1988).

65. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3238 (West 1985).
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Arrest authority, with or without a warrant, is a creature of statute." Clearly, Congress could expressly empower miJitary officials to
carry out arrest warrants on civilians accompanying the armed forces
outside of United States territory and to make warrantless arrests
based on probable cause. 67 Both S. 129 and the Schiff Amendment
would have authorized the Secretary of Defense to designate military
law enforcement personnel to "apprehend and detain, outside the
United States, any person [subject to the bill] who is reasonably believed to have engaged in conduct which constitutes a criminal offense
[as defined by the bill].""6 Both proposed statutes also addressed
some of the political and social concerns attendant to military involvement in the arrest of civilians by requiring that arrested persons "shall
be released to the custody of civilian law enforcement authorities of
the United States for removal to the United States for judicial
proceedings.... 6 9
However, neither proposal addressed a procedural element which
is a key to effectively implementing Article III court jurisdiction over
offenses committed overseas. That element is the initial appearance
and, in cases of warrantless arrest, the probable cause determination
before a federal magistrate judge as required by the 'Fourth Amendment10 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a). That rule requires that an arresting official "take the arrested person without
unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal magistrate
judge or, in the event that a federal magistrate judge is not reasonably
available, before a state or local judicial officer authorized by 18
U.S.C. § 3041." 71 According to the Supreme Court in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,7' the Fourth Amendment requires this appearance to occur within forty-eight hours of a warrantless arrest, absent a
showing of emergency or extraordinary circumstances.
66. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3041, 3052, 3061 (West 1985) (addressing state officers,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and postal inspectors, respectively.) See also FrD. R.
CRiM. P. 4(a) (stating a warrant for the arrest of the defendant shall issue to any officer
authorized by law to execute it.)
67. The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits using the military to execute civil laws except
when expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1385
(West 1984).
68. S. 129, supra note 47, § 992(e)(1); Schiff Amendment, supra note 48, § 3262(e)(1)
(1993).
69. S.129, supra note 47, § 992(e)(2); Schiff Amendment, supra note 48, § 3262(e)(2)
(1993).
70. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-13 (1975).
71. 72 FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a).
72. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
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Considering that U.S. military personnel are often stationed in
volatile environments extremely far from U.S. territories, the Riverside rule raises several questions. Can civilians arrested by military
police in foreign countries be reliably transferred to the custody of
United States civilian authorities and transported to appear before a
federal magistrate within forty-eight hours? If not, can prosecutors
successfully argue that "extraordinary circumstances" excuse the failure? Would it be proper to extend to military judges located in foreign countries the authority to conduct the Rule 5(a) hearing? If so,
who would serve as counsel for the government and for the
defendant?
Forty-eight hours is a short time when one is faced with a complicated task involving military and civil coordination over thousands of
miles and several time zones. Almost inevitably the Riverside standard would prove untenable in some cases. Congress could expressly
designate military judges to conduct the hearings and military attorneys to represent the parties.73 However, such a decision would likely
run into opposition from both military and civilian sources concerned
about increasing the military's involvement in prosecuting civilians in
peacetime, even if that involvement would only be an overseas proxy
for the federal courts. The better solution would be to attempt to satisfy the Riverside forty-eight hour rule, falling back on the "extraordinary circumstances" exception if it cannot be done. If authorities can
show a good faith effort to bring a defendant before a federal magistrate judge within forty-eight hours of arrest, judges should, within
reason, consider logistical impracticability an "extraordinary
circumstance."

None of these issues present insurmountable obstacles to the extension of Article III court jurisdiction over civilians accompanying
the United States military in foreign countries. However, they must
be considered before enacting legislation. Furthermore, Congress, the
military, and the Department of Justice should consider whether the
problem is serious enough to make the effort worthwhile.
IV.

Conclusion: Is This Trip Necessary?

The problems associated with the "jurisdictional gap" created by
the lack of United States criminal jurisdiction over civilians accompa73. All armed forces have independent, full time military judges and defense counsel,

along with command lawyers, serving at or nearby all major United States military installations overseas.
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nying the armed forces have been more perceived than actual, at least
in terms of the numbers of cases where civilians have "gotten away"
with crimes because the host country could not or would not prosecute.74 Those numbers should grow smaller still in coming years,
given the shrinking American military presence overseas. However,
the potential gap remains great, if not in number, then in the severity
of the crimes.
Some American criminal statutes already have exfraterritorial effect and apply to perpetrators, including civilians accompanying the
armed forces, wherever the offenses are committed. Examples include treason,75 espionage, and related crimes,76 conspiracy to defraud
the United States, 77 bribery of United States officials, 78 and stealing
property of the United States. 79 However, except for stealing U.S.
property, these offenses are not common in American military communities overseas. "Street crimes" such as homicide, robbery and
burglary, larcenies against private victims, and sex crimes are the primary concern. Under Title 18 of the United States Code, these must
be committed within the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction
of the United States" to be violations of U.S. law.80 By definition, the
territory of a foreign sovereign is not included.8 1 Drug offenses, also
extremely common, are not punished under Title 21 of the U.S. Code
unless they occur in United States territory or, in the case of trafficking, are intended to reach American territory.82
74. McClelland, supra note 46, at 173-82. In an exhaustive study of this issue, Captain
McClelland relied on a 1979 Government Accounting Office audit report and a 1984 De-

partment of Defense report in concluding that only a "small [jurisdictional] void" exists
where host countries waive their jurisdiction over civilians accomparying the American
military and the United States cannot take action for lack of jurisdic.tion under United
States law. Id. at 180. The author thinks that Captain McClelland's conclusion is still valid.
75. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2381 (West 1970).

76. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 793, 794 (West 1976).
77. 18 U.S.C.A. § 286 (West 1969).
78. 18 U.S.C.A. § 201 (West 1969).
79. 18 U.S.C.A. § 641 (West 1976).
80. See e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1111-13, 2111, 661, 2241-44 (West 1976). See also 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 81 (arson), 113 (assault), 662 (receiving stolen property), 1201 (kidnapping),
and 1363 (malicious mischief) (West 1969), all of which require an act to have been committed within the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States."
81. 18 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West 1969).

82. Nowhere in The Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 and its punitive
sections (eg. §§ 841-44) is the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States" mentioned. See generally 21 U.S.C.A. ch. 13 (West Supp. 1 1994). It has been held

that drug trafficking activities constitute violations of section 841 wherever they occur, but
only if their target is United States territory. United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836 (1st Cir.
1980); United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1980). It has also been held that
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These "street crimes" cannot always be adequately addressed by
the host country. A host nation may be indifferent to an offense committed entirely within the American military community that has no
ramifications outside the gates of the base. Furthermore, the host
country may not be able to prosecute at all, because the alleged perpetrator is no longer within its territory or for other legal reasons.P Accordingly, Congress should give the United States the option to
prosecute serious crimes which, for one reason or another, the host
country may not adequately redress. Even if such a provision is used
sparingly, it will be of great value on the occasions when it is needed.
Moreover, the visible presence of American justice on the "far side of
the world" will serve as a deterrent, at least to some potential
criminals on bases overseas. S. 129 and the Schiff Amendment were
good efforts and are worth following through.
Congress did not intend section 844, which prohibits drug possession, to have extraterritorial effect. United States v. Gladue, 4 MJ. 1 (C.M.A. 1977).
83. An excellent "worst case" scenario is discussed in McClelland, supra note 46. at
180-182. Under the SOFA between the United States and the Republic of Korea, the
United States obtains exclusive jurisdiction over all its personnel, including both the military and civilians accompanying them, whenever martial law is declared in Korea. This has
happened a number of times over the years when United States forces have been present
on the Korean Peninsula. In such circumstances, any offenses committed by American
civilians accompanying the military could not have been prosecuted by either the Koreans
or the Americans. In 1980, the author defended an American airman who had murdered a
Korean prostitute in a general court-martial at Osan Air Base in the Republic of Korea.
Ordinarily, the Koreans would have prosecuted the case. However, the murder had occurred during the martial law declared following the 1979 assassination of Korean President Park Chung-hee, thus giving the United States exclusive jurisdiction. If that crime
had been committed by the husband of an Air Force member, a Department of Defense
Dependent Schools teacher, or other person covered by the SOFA but not subject to the
U.C.MJ., he would never have been brought to trial by either the United States or Korea.

